Value Added Article: Can Lateral Entry in the IAS Ensure Good Governance? | Category – Governance | Source – EPW

Relevance: GS Paper 2 (Polity & Governance)

Source:

Economic and Political Weekly


Why has this article surfaced?

The recent decision of the central government to allow lateral entry for joint secretary-level posts comes in the wake of a long-pending need for administrative reform.


The need of lateral entry

The advertised positions for LE are presented as a “magic bullet” for fixing the system in terms of policy formulation, implementation, and administration of various programmes and schemes in the government.


New Public Management

  • The New Public Management (NPM) is a paradigm of hybrid administration that calls for the integration of diverse actors in governance. These actors include the state, market, and civil society where the government is strengthening the political line of command through the privatisation of bureaucracy.
  • The LE decision is being presented as a mini-reform considering the government’s disenchantment with the old public administration.

Issues with the lateral entry (LE)

  • Without addressing the fundamental problems, the LE system cannot be expected to bring about desired solutions.
  • It overlooks the need to assist the respective ministries in developing their team of experts and could prove to be detrimental in the long run.
  • LE appointees will find difficult to navigate institutional inertia and learn the practicalities of governance within the few years of the contract period.
  • Generally, these experts represent the ideals of the ivory tower. The ecosystem of governance involves multiple layers of stakeholders and interest groups.
  • Given the systemic constraints, the eligibility criteria for candidates in the advertisement for LE are vague.
  • Even if these entries are being justified solely on the rationale of lack of workforce, it is surprising to note that the number of vacancies in the UPSC is increasingly declining over the years.
  • LE leads to the government’s circumvention of constitutional provisions.
  • How the lateral “change-agents” would ensure good governance is unclear. The precedents of patronage signal that there is a higher chance that the government might use plum postings in the bureaucracy as backdoor entry for its political gains.
  • The potential interaction orders between the “parachute babus” and the “know-it-all” generalists would bring in more complications.
  • Also, the work culture and environment may be unconducive for outsiders as one often requires patience to survive in the archaic system.
  • Regarding the procedural labyrinth, there is a higher chance that the lateral entrants could even become generalists in their struggles to fit into the system.
  • Furthermore, the system of LE may create a new ivory tower within the administration bypassing the established procedures of governance.
  • Since most of the LEs would come from non-state domains only for a period of five years, it is not clear how the Official Secrets Act would be applicable to them and how the government would prevent them from using system-related information after their stint as joint secretary is over.
  • It is unclear how the instant preference for specialisation can replace the decades-long experience that a bureaucrat brings to the position.
  • How will the state ensure that a lateral entrant does not use the position as a revolving door between public and private institutions and go against the state exchequer?
  • How will the government ensure disciplinary controls? As these are essential aspects considering the constrained legal system in India, one can notice the absence of institutional mechanisms to monitor the potential conflict of interests.

LE and Privatization

  • In the initial years of liberalisation, the need for profit maximisation paved the way for public–private–partnership (PPP). This has been gradually bridging the dichotomies of state and market in India.
  • Though this bridging is on the principles of PPP, LE signals changes in the very conception of the public.
  • Given that ideals of privatisation already seem to have the patronage of the state and the public, the LEs will go one step further in legitimising the privatised ideals of citizenship in governance.
  • Moreover, in a globalising world, the development deficits of market capitalism are overlooked and there is a higher chance that LEs will have a pro-market bias if they come from a corporate background.
  • In a possible extrapolation, one can even expect that the state governments will also take a similar route in creating wholesale openings for contractual hiring.

Effect on Serving Officers

  • The LE process will not ensure a level-playing field for serving officers.
  • The seniority list-in-waiting could be disturbed as the LEs will slow down the cadre progression.
  • It would unjustly deprive the serving officers of those coveted posts at the culmination of their respective careers.
  • While politics often prevents the generalists from specialising like domain experts even if they want to, it is an open secret that the closeness to political leaders is the determining factor for plum postings. There is no correlation between the postings and their area of specialisation because appointments and transfers are almost random (Ghate 1998).
  • The LE process, in effect, may enfeeble the ailing bureaucracy as well as demotivate new entrants.
  • Additionally, there could be collateral exits from the career bureaucrats to the corporate sector. In consequence, this would mean a death knell for governance.

Way forward

  • If the intention is to enhance administrative reform, the specialists must be recruited from within the system. This could be done through systemic coordination with the UPSC.
  • The government must spell out a clear road map for holistic governance reforms. For instance, the annual confidential reports shall also concentrate on the appraisal along with the periodic retraining of the bureaucrats.

Conclusion

Though these normative prescriptions would address the memorable slogans of transformational governance, the quality of administration will mostly depend on the expertise of the ministers.


 

Leave a Reply